HANKYOREH

APLN member Cheong Wook-sik noted that attempting to meet the conditions for OPCON transfer has thus far led North Korea to dig in its heels on its nuclear program, a peace treaty might present a viable solution to the intractable dilemma.

In that case, how do you solve the dilemma of OPCON transfer and inter-Korean relations? We can consider the matter irrespective of the conditions for recovering OPCON, or completely rethink the conditions.

Instead of trying to set the conditions, we can set the timing. During the era of Roh Moo-hyun and George W. Bush, the date for a potential OPCON transfer was April 17, 2012; during the Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama era, it was Dec. 1, 2015.

But the Park Geun-hye administration sent a distress beacon to the US, and Washington changed the nature of the agreement from timeline-focused to conditional. The Lee Jae Myung administration can refer to such precedents and opt for negotiations that focus on a timeline. As it happens, the Trump administration is demanding that its allies take responsibility for their own defense.

With this in mind, the Lee administration can consider trying to negotiate a timeline at the Security Consultative Meeting that will likely take place in November.

This option has the advantage of being flexible when it comes to joint training exercises with the US and to increases in defense spending. Domestically, however, there are concerns about considerable backlash.

Another option is forgetting about OPCON and focusing on resuming the Korean Peninsula peace process and, importantly, signing a peace treaty. I regard that as the most practical and sensible way of resolving this dilemma. The OPCON handover was a product of the Korean War and the armistice that ended it. As a result, a peace treaty that officially ended that war and kick-started peacebuilding would be the ideal backdrop for regaining OPCON.

There’s a historical argument for such an approach. South Korean President Syngman Rhee gave the US “command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities” in a letter to US Gen. Douglas MacArthur on July 14, 1950, 20 days after the outbreak of the Korean War. Signing a peace treaty would officially represent the end of that “state of hostilities.”

As such, Lee needs to make signing a peace treaty before leaving office a major policy goal. Critics will complain that such a goal is unrealistic, but that is not necessarily true.

The parties to a peace treaty are South Korea, North Korea, the US and China. North Korea and China have consistently spoken of the need for a peace treaty, as have some (but not all) South Korean administrations. As it happens, the current Lee administration emphasizes the need for a peace treaty.

What about the US, which holds the key to peace? Traditionally speaking, US administrations have either been uninterested in a peace treaty or have maintained that such a treaty would only be possible after North Korea’s complete denuclearization.

But Trump has been more proactive about pursuing a peace treaty. Furthermore, a majority of Americans are in favor of the idea. In short, there’s a definite political opportunity to pursue a peace treaty through dialogue between Korea and the US.

In terms of inter-Korean relations, pursuing a peace treaty is the most effective way to counter North Korea’s narrative about the two sides being hostile, belligerent states.

A more pragmatic and flexible position is also being adopted on the North Korean nuclear issue, which is closely linked with the peace treaty. American politicians on both sides of the aisle are redefining denuclearization as a long-term objective and are warming up to an arms control approach that would begin by seeking to freeze and reduce North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. That’s essentially the gradual approach to denuclearization endorsed by the Lee administration, which has called for freezing, reducing and ultimately eliminating North Korea’s nuclear program.

While the gap with North Korea remains wide, there’s clearly more of a chance for dialogue than in the past. As such, one potential approach is to conclude a peace treaty at the “freeze” or “reduction” phase of denuclearization and include language about working together to make the world (including the Korean Peninsula) free of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use.

It’s critical that we initiate those efforts through cooperation with the US. The most effective way would be for the South Korean and American presidents to declare a moratorium on joint military exercises and propose dialogue with North Korea either during the UN General Assembly or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.

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