INDIA TODAY

APLN member Shyam Saran points out that a more assertive Chinese posture towards India is likely, even if there are tactical shifts dictated by the G20 and SCO summits. Read the original article here.

The national party congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which being convened on October 16 in Beijing, will be closely watched across the world. Its proceedings will convey important indicators of Chinese domestic and foreign policies in a more significantly altered geopolitical landscape and a more challenging political and economic situation at home. Globally, every country is grappling with heightened uncertainty and rapid, relentless change. China is no exception. How is it setting the stage for formulating and articulating an appropriate strategy for a more challenging environment?

China’s top party and state leader, Xi Jinping, is likely to receive endorsement of the congress for continuance in these positions at least for another five-year term. Although he is already the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, the rhetoric leading up to the congress suggests he is seeking an even greater measure of authority. This is reflected in efforts to suggest an equivalence in eminence and in power with Mao. For example, there are reports that Xi may be anointed as party chairman, a position given up in 1982 under Deng Xiaoping, who wanted a more collective form of leadership and a rejection of the personality cult around a leader that was the hallmark of Mao’s leadership. The party constitution already recognises Xi as an outstanding ideologue of the party. His ideas are enshrined in the constitution as “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era”. This phrase may be replaced by a more pithy “Xi Jinping Thought”, again establishing an equivalence with Mao, whose ideas are encapsulated as “Mao Zedong Thought”. Finally, party media have begun to refer to Xi as the “helmsman”, as Mao was often addressed. It is clear that we should expect a more powerful, a more ideologically inclined and assertive leader of China after the party congress.

China is confronting an unprecedented, even crisis-like, situation on the economic front. There are structural reasons why China’s GDP growth is unlikely to sustain the high rate witnessed over the past four decades. Like other mature economies, China is experiencing declining factor productivity. Its population has begun to decline and is rapidly aging. The external economic environment, which was so favourable to China over the years when the “Washington Consensus” of open markets and efficient supply chains reigned, is now over. These structural factors are currently exacerbated by more cyclical and short-term factors. These include a high rate of indebtedness, supply chain disruptions triggered by the persistence with its zero-Covid policy and the bursting of the over-leveraged property market, which has been the main driver of Chinese growth over the past several years. Against a target of 5.5 per cent GDP growth for the current year, the likely outcome may be closer to 3 per cent or less. How may the party congress deal with this adverse situation?

It is also unlikely that the regulatory assault on the most successful and dynamic of Chinese private sector entities, like Alibaba or Weibo, will be halted or reversed. The renewed emphasis on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as the advance guard in the economic and technological transformation of the Chinese economy will be reaffirmed. In dealing with the property crisis, it is again the SOEs that are leading the effort to turn around financially strained private companies. The emphasis on economic self-reliance remains under the “dual circulation” policy, which clearly gives precedence to import substitution and relative technological autonomy.

Ideological factors will influence economic decisions more than mere pragmatism. We are likely to see grea­ter focus on technological self-reliance and this may be reflected in the emergence of a more highly educated and technocratic new generation of leaders. Xi Jinping believes that technology will be the decisive battleground of the future and the source of power of a modern state. We should expect a much greater emphasis on, and investment in, the acquisition of high-tech capabilities.

The party leadership recognises that it confronts a more adverse and unpredictable environment. The call for greater efforts, even sacrifices, is coupled with renewed confidence in the imminent achievement of the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation. Here is what Xi Jinping said in a recent article in the party journal Qiu Shi: ‘Our party must be united to lead the people to face major challenges effectively, defend against major risks, overcome major barriers and resolve major contradictions. We must press on with great struggles under new historical characteristics.’

The repeated use of the word ‘major’ reflects the seriousness of these challenges. Xi claims that the country “has never been closer to achieving its great rejuvenation but the last mile will be full of perils and challenges”. The inevitability of Chinese rejuvenation, as an idea, has now been tempered with a dose of unpredictability.

What about Chinese foreign policy after the congress? Former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger seems to think that after consolidating his leadership at the congress, Xi Jinping is likely to make some conciliatory moves towards the US, acknowledging that his bet on Russia’s Putin has gone sour. While China may distance itself to some degree from Russia, it is unlikely to undertake a major shift towards the US. Xi’s ideological preferences stand in the way. This is apparent from constant references to the danger from US-inspired “colour revolutions”, which seek to undermine and subvert socialist countries through ideological contamination. Regime security has always been the priority for authoritarian states.

Against this background, one should not expect any change in China’s India policy. A more assertive, even obdurate, Chinese posture towards India is likely after the congress, even if there are some tactical shifts dictated by the forthcoming G20 and SCO meetings, which will be chaired by India.

Image: AP