THE DIPLOMAT

APLN member Jina Kim writes for The Diplomat and points out that South Korea has an opportunity to elevate its status as a NATO partner, but this might strain relations with China and provoke retaliatory actions from Russia.

At the July 2024 NATO summit, member states issued the Washington Summit Declaration, which notably focused on condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and outlining how allies and partners should respond. The declaration included a paragraph on military cooperation among Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran, emphasizing that North Korea’s support for Russia is illegal and violates United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Unlike last year’s Vilnius summit, which concentrated on proliferation concerns and denuclearization obligations, this year’s summit centered on support for the Russian military from North Korea, which is believed to be prolonging the war in Ukraine. Consequently, the Korean Peninsula has become more relevant to NATO’s sphere of interest, highlighting the increased importance of South Korea as a NATO partner.

The inclusion of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea, members of the so-called Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4), at the NATO Summit for the third consecutive year reflects U.S. interests in reorganizing its alliance relations. Kurt Campbell, the U.S. deputy secretary of state, noted that Washington aims to institutionalize the IP4 grouping and seeks opportunities to involve South Korea in other engagements.

South Korea’s potential to arm Ukraine could elevate its status as a capable NATO partner. Given these circumstances, the call for a stronger partnership with NATO presents opportunities for South Korea. However, it also presents challenges because joining this alignment could involve costly signaling, where the stronger the commitment to the partnership, the higher the cost.

At the cost of souring relations with China and increasing uncertainty about Russia’s potential military aid to North Korea in retaliation, South Korea finds itself in a position where it must signal its alignment commitment. Seoul’s signaling can be examined through its rhetoric and provision of assistance, which helps us understand how South Korea navigates two significant challenges. The first challenge is managing relations with China, which was reflected in South Korea’s rhetoric after the NATO summit. The second challenge involves altering the nature of Seoul’s military assistance to Ukraine, based on its assessment of the strategic benefits. This shift can be observed in how South Korea has adjusted the scale of its assistance following the summit.

The full article can be accessed here.

Image: Wikimedia Commons