THE TRIBUNE

APLN member Shyam Saran writes: The decree signed by President Putin a few days ago — to annex Donbas — looks more like a desperate gambit rather than a celebration of success. Read the original article here.

Since the early days of the Ukraine war, I have been arguing that whatever may happen on the battlefield, Russia has already lost this war. This so-called ‘special military operation’ was supposed to be a short swift advance into the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, the collapse of the Zelenskyy government, to be replaced by a pro-Moscow regime, waiting in the wings and Europe and the world faced with a fait accompli. The model was the swift occupation of Crimea in 2014 which went uncontested except for a few token sanctions.

In the initial phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a Russian general had said on TV that the instructions given to the Russian army was to wrap up the operation within four days! We know now how mistaken that assumption was. But it was not only the Russians who went wrong in their expectations. So did most of the West. The US had offered to evacuate Zelenskyy to safety. It had not anticipated a spirited fight by the Ukrainians. The Chinese, too, had been surprised. It is unlikely that Chinese President Xi Jinping would have signed a ‘no limits partnership’ and a ‘no forbidden areas of cooperation’ statement with President Putin just days before the invasion, if he had any hint that his comrade-in-arms would soon be sinking deeper into the quicksand of an unwinnable war. China’s increasing discomfort is palpable. At the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit, there was an unusual and public acknowledgement by Putin of rising Chinese concerns: ‘We understand your questions and your concerns in this regard (i.e. the Ukrainian crisis) and we will certainly offer a detailed explanation of our stand on this issue.’

The failure to take Kyiv led Putin to redefine his war aims. These were scaled down to ensuring the security of the Russian-speaking Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, parts of which were already occupied by pro-Russian militias. Russian troops were regrouped to concentrate on achieving the control and occupation of Donbas but even this limited objective has not been achieved. Significant parts of the region remain under Ukrainian control and there is now a full-scale counter-attack by Ukrainian forces to oust the Russians from positions they had entrenched themselves in. The decree signed by Putin a few days ago, to annex Donbas, looks more like a desperate gambit rather than a celebration of success.

Ukrainian forces have managed to evict a substantial Russian force from Lyman, which served as an important transport and logistics hub leading into Donbas. The Russian defence ministry acknowledged the setback in a statement on October 1: ‘In connection with the creation of a threat of encirclement, the allied troops were withdrawn from the city to a more advantageous location.’

The fiction of a ‘special military operation’ also lies in tatters with the ministry’s September 21 announcement on drafting 3 lakh reservists to support its military campaign. The long lines of Russians threading through the country’s borders with Central Asian states and Georgia to escape the draft is also an embarrassment because it calls into question whether ordinary Russians see the war as a great patriotic struggle, as Putin would have the world believe. There have been public demonstrations, even violence, against the draft. Putin’s attempt to now mobilise his people by characterising this as a war against the West, rather than just Ukraine, is not working.

Putin is right that this is no longer a war about Ukraine. It is a confrontation with the West, in particular the US. It is the material and military support flowing from the West which has enabled Ukraine to blunt and counter-attack the more formidable Russian forces. The US is committed to weakening Russia to the point that it may no longer threaten its European neighbours. The pressure is on Russia to bring this war to an end. European countries may have their reservations but cannot afford to go against the US, which still guarantees their security. The war may linger on and Russia will suffer even greater damage.

One should also factor in the growing concerns among Central Asian states, formerly part of the Soviet Union, about Russia claiming the right to defend ethnic Russian populations within the borders of other states. Several of these states, like Kazakhstan, have significant ethnic Russian minorities and would be alarmed at the incorporation of Donbas into Russia on the basis of ethnicity.

Putin has repeated his threat to use nuclear weapons. ‘In its aggressive anti-Russian policy, the West has crossed every line. This is not a bluff. And those who try to blackmail us with nuclear weapons should know that the weathervane can turn and point towards them.’

The US has said it has communicated to Putin the disastrous consequences which may follow the use of nuclear weapons by Russia, even if these are low-yield theatre weapons. Curiously, there has been a US statement to indicate that if Russia uses theatre weapons in Ukraine, the western response may not be a nuclear one. This may encourage Putin to use nuclear weapons. A posture of strategic ambiguity, as in the case of Taiwan, may have been a more effective warning.

Putin’s threat of using nuclear weapons endangers international peace and security much more than its aggression against Ukraine. India should unreservedly condemn such a threat in line with its consistent policy of opposing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Friendship with Russia cannot justify turning a blind eye to the catastrophic consequences which may follow such brandishing of nuclear threats.

Image: AP