Donald Trump has been elected the 47th President of the United States in the US Presidential elections which took place on the November 5, 2024. Trump’s re-elections as US President has raised expectations of a far more assertive US foreign policy. At the same time, there are evolving concerns about the new administration’s potential trade and military policies. In the Asia-Pacific, a region where the United States has deep strategic, economic and security interests, there is a sense of uncertainty and anticipation about how the Trump 2.0 administration will deal with the the region.

For this week’s Pulse, Frank O’Donnell, Tong Zhao, Tetsuo Kotani, Ji Hye Shin, Mely Caballero-Anthony and Sujata Mehta weigh in on how they foresee the next four years of their country’s engagement with the United States.

Frank O’Donnell

APLN Senior Research Advisor

How do you expect the US Indo-Pacific Strategy to shift under a new Trump administration?

Despite the similarities between the Indo-Pacific Strategy documents of the Biden and 2017-2021 Trump administrations – such as the 2019 State Department implementation report, and declassified 2018 U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific – the regional policy of the new Trump administration will be likely characterised by greater inconsistency, unpredictability, and tensions with US allies and partners. The incoming Trump team has spent much of its time out of office developing plans to eliminate existing and perceived checks-and-balances within the US Executive Branch which could constrain Trump’s impulses, including introducing political loyalty tests for staffers. This means that the new administration’s policies will much more closely resemble the views of its leader than in Trump’s first term. As such, Trump’s historic focus on the price, but not the value, of US alliances and partnerships will form the lens through which his new administration views the region to an even greater degree than before. This will spark another round of confrontations with key Indo-Pacific partners concerning whether Trump feels they are paying enough “protection money” for US strategic cooperation and military deployments. Trump’s emphasis on introducing tariffs will also harm regional economies. Moreover, as Trump’s impulsiveness and unpredictability begins to characterise US foreign policy, Indo-Pacific states may begin independently taking the necessary steps to improve their defence and political autonomy from the United States. This outcome will indeed be an implicit, and perhaps even explicit, goal of Trump’s regional approach.

Tong Zhao

Senior Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and APLN Member

How do you anticipate a new Trump administration to engage with China? Do you foresee increased nuclear competition and arms race between the United States and China?

The Trump 2.0 administration would probably place greater emphasis on responding to China’s nuclear buildup, with Chinese nuclear capabilities likely featuring prominently in any new Nuclear Posture Review. Trump might pursue a dual-track strategy: publicly demonstrating resolve to strengthen America’s nuclear capabilities while intensifying diplomatic pressure on Beijing to join arms control negotiations. While Trump may believe such assertive posturing could compel Beijing to negotiate, his advisors could be more skeptical of diplomatic success and more firmly committed to expanding US nuclear capabilities. Some might even support resuming nuclear testing to demonstrate American resolve and deter Beijing.

Beijing appears to severely underestimate both the risk of a nuclear arms race and the importance of greater transparency and self-restraint in its nuclear policy as a measure of reassurance. If Washington begins expanding its nuclear arsenal, Chinese experts are unlikely to dismiss this as militarily insignificant or advocate for calm. Both nations risk knowingly entering a nuclear arms race.

Tetsuo Kotani

Professor at Meikai University and Senior Fellow at Japan Institute of International Affairs

What implications might the new US administration have on the Japan-US Alliance, in the next four years, particularly as it relates to nuclear issues?

With Donald Trump back in the White House, Tokyo will further enhance self-defence capabilities while strengthening the alliance cooperation with Washington. Japan needs to review the defence procurement plans reflecting the power under the weak yen, establish a robust cyber security posture and information security, and revitalise its defense industrial base. To further strengthen the alliance, Japan must work with the United States to enhance command and control coordination and integrity and readiness of the two militaries, increase the credibility of extended deterrence, and promote defence industrial cooperation. Japan can invest in the US shipbuilding industry so that the United States can catch up with China in naval buildup. Japan can also strengthen energy security by investing in US oil and gas industry. Japan will work with the United States on economic security and de-risking against China.

Japan would welcome the next Trump administration’s policy of peace through strength. This is the case particularly in the nuclear realm. The first Trump administration approved the development of submarine-launch nuclear cruise missile, which was suspended by the Biden administration. As North Korea expands its tactical nuclear capabilities and China builds up its strategic and probably even tactical nuclear arsenal, the lack of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the western Pacific is a great concern for Japan. The incoming US administration’s willingness for modernising US nuclear posture is reassuring. Japan can assist modernised US nuclear posture in the theatre by providing support and protection to US submarines, for instance.

Ji Hye Shin

Chief Researcher at theTaejae Future Consensus Institute, leading research on US-China relations, nuclear security, and emerging technologies.

What implications might the new US administration have on the ROK-US alliance, particularly as it relates to nuclear issues?

Donald Trump’s second term will put to the test not only the ROK-US alliance, but the global nuclear non-proliferation regime as well. Trump’s transactional approach to alliances will continue to undermine South Korea’s— and other allies’— confidence in the long-standing US commitment to extended deterrence and give rise to concerns about the possibility of implicitly or explicitly sanctioning them to pursue their own nuclear deterrent as a cost-cutting measure. The uncertainty and mutual distrust thus created could result in miscalculation and overreaction by China and North Korea, subsequently setting off a dangerous action-reaction cycle in the region.

Furthermore, the Trump administration’s anticipated move to up the ante in its strategic competition against China could destabilise not just the US alliance system in the region, but also the US-led nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) system more broadly. With Trump loyalists and known China hawks set to drive US foreign and national security policy for the next four years, the United States is poised to accelerate nuclear modernisation and resume nuclear weapons testing. A nuclear arms race between Washington and Beijing runs the risk of normalizing practices previously unthinkable such as nuclear testing, arms racing, and friendly proliferation, which could further imperil, not protect, US allies.

Mely Caballero-Anthony

Professor of International Relations and Associate Dean and Head of Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies at RSIS (NTU); APLN Board Member.

What does a Trump 2.0 administration in the United States mean for the stability of the US-Philippines Alliance? Do you foresee the United States playing a more proactive role in the South China Sea? 

Given the current security concerns in the South China Sea, re-elected US President Trump will most likely take a hard-line stance on China. This could benefit the US allies in Asia, particularly the Philippines. Given China’s assertive maritime posture, the United States may continue or ramp up joint naval exercises with its allies and other friendly countries in the Indo-Pacific region to secure freedom of navigation and counter China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea. However, President Trump’s unpredictability and “America First” policy continue to raise concerns about the US’ reliability as a steadfast security partner in an increasingly hostile geopolitical environment.  As he did with NATO allies, Trump may demand from its US allies in Asia to share more of the financial burden and contribute more actively to joint initiatives, including exercises in contested maritime zones. This further raises questions about the consistency of US engagement in the region’s security dynamics.

The US-Philippines defence treaty has been around for over seven decades and has been described by the Biden administration as an ‘iron clad’ defence partnership. This partnership was strengthened in 2023 when the Philippines agreed to grant the United States access to four additional bases under their Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDSA), and in turn, Washington in 2024, committed US$500 million military support to the Philippines to help modernise its armed forces. While the incoming Trump administration is known for its transactional approach to foreign policy, maintaining strong defence ties with the Philippines aligns with the US strategic interests given the intensifying competition with China. Nonetheless, Manila may need to put in more effort in emphasising the Philippines’ strategic importance to the Trump 2.0 administration to ensure that the US will uphold existing military agreements and underscore their mutual interest to counter regional threats particularly from China.

Sujata Mehta

Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament; APLN Member

How do you foresee the trajectory of India’s engagement with the United States under a Trump 2.0 administration?

It’s been less than a week since the US elections and there are about ten weeks for the new US Administration to take office, and there’s a pervasive and heightened sense of uncertainty. It’s something of a cliche that each country’s most consequential relationship is with the United States, and observers of US policy everywhere would be trying to anticipate the shape of disruption ahead, while keeping a close watch for announcements of key appointments as signals of what may lie ahead. It is possible that some changes may be set in motion even before January 20, 2025 in the form of preemptive moves – including in the Asia-Pacific region.

During the presidential campaign, both trade and security have been highlighted for early action by the incoming Administration, with the promise of a fundamental change in approach, and all have been put on notice that the old rules won’t apply.

This at a time when the international system is grappling – ineffectively – with major conflicts in West Asia and Europe, a new order impatient with the status quo and the old guardrails in international affairs could lead to greater disequilibrium including changes in the global nuclear landscape, and rising tensions in trade relations – both of which would be of serious concern for countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

It is noteworthy that while profound change is the likely order of the days ahead, Indian writers generally agree that the trajectory of India-US relations will continue to be positive, on account of subjective and objective factors.