Integration of Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Systems and Escalation Risks
The contemporary global nuclear landscape is dotted with several nuclear risks. Geopolitical conflagrations, coupled with nuclear modernisation efforts by major nuclear-armed states and the strategies of brinkmanship, are increasing the risks of miscalculation and unintended escalation. Emerging technologies such as cyber weapons, artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous systems exacerbate those risks. The great power competition, which the United States (US) officials describe as one characterised by “near-peer competitors,” has acted as a structural catalyst fuelling security dilemmas for the US, Russia and China to pursue advanced technology in warfare and gain competitive advantage. However, in this quest, the element of ‘ever-accelerating automation in warfare’ has become the only constant, whose implications transcend great power competition.
Technological advancements have improved precision, lethality, range autonomy, and effect, which in turn have upgraded nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities. Alongside the nuclear modernisation and doctrine-related developments, there is enough evidence to highlight the integration of conventional and nuclear capabilities leading to the emergence of dual-capable and dual-role weapon systems. Besides, as part of modernisation efforts, several states are considering the potential integration of AI in their nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3), including early warning systems to enhance operational efficiency. This integration, however, is not without risks, as it increases the prospects of faulty judgment and false warnings of attack among other miscalculations.
The plausibility of these scenarios has reshaped the analytical community’s understanding of escalation risks, strategic stability and the deterrence dynamics associated with the nuclear-conventional entanglement. This policy brief reviews the escalation risks arising from the integration of AI in nuclear systems and offers some thoughts on how to mitigate these risks. The brief also examines how these technological developments, specifically AI, could influence India’s nuclear arsenal.
About the Authors
Sameer Patil, PhD is Director, Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation. His work focuses on the intersection of technology and national security. He has previously worked at the National Security Council Secretariat, Government of India and Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. He is the author of Securing India in the Cyber Era (Routledge, 2022) and has co-edited The Making of a Global Bharat (Har-Anand, 2024) and Moving Forward EU-India Relations: The Significance of the Security Dialogues (Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2017).
Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with Strategic Studies Programme (SSP) at Observer Research Foundation. He is also a PhD candidate at Diplomacy and Disarmament division, CIOPD, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His research interests include strategic issues in the Indo-Pacific region with a focus on military strategy and modernisation, domains of warfare, and the intersection of technology and warfare. His secondary research interests include nuclear deterrence, arms control and strategic trade controls.
The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network or any of its members.
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