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Strengthening SouthKorea’s Non-Proliferation Norm: Should Anti-Nuclear Arguments Have Emotional Appeal?

by Alexander M Hynd

At one level, efforts to contain, diminish and eventually eliminate possession of nuclear weapons must necessarily be global. Yet, for as long as nation states remain the dominant actors in world affairs, anti-nuclear advocates need to pay particular attention to those countries most at risk of horizontal proliferation. Within the Asia-Pacific, South Korea is viewed as having a particularly weak non-proliferation norm, and as one of the most likely states to ‘go nuclear’. As such, those concerned with preventing a wider regional nuclear arms race should consider how best to promote the non-proliferation cause within South Korea’s domestic political setting.

Anumber of arguments have been presented in favor of South Korea acquiring either its own nuclear arsenal, or re-introducing American tactical nuclear weapons. These justifications are all based on the spurious logic that such a policy would assist in better deterring or denuclearizing North Korea, by changing strategic calculations on the peninsula. However, a 2019 poll showed that 60% of South Koreans support Korea maintaining nuclear weapons even after unification – suggesting that there may be a more deep-seated psychological appeal to proliferation on the peninsula.

Meanwhile, opponents of nuclear proliferation have so far relied on a competing collection of rational arguments. A nuclear South Korea would risk angering the US and China, and likely be targeted by crushing international sanctions. It would also legitimate North Korea’s own nuclear program and trigger a new nuclear arms race, while permanently damaging the South’s hard-won international reputation as a responsible member of the international community.

This set of anti-proliferation arguments may have helped persuade President Moon Jae-in to rule out the pursuit of nuclear weapons under his administration. Yet they have so far failed to make much impact upon the public, a majority of whom have long supported an independent SouthKorean nuclear arsenal. Nor have they satisfied all the members of Seoul’s foreign policy elite, some of whom have been increasingly vocal in their public calls for the country to consider its nuclear options.

The most likely path to Seoul ‘going nuclear’ is via the future election of a pro-nuclear right- wing populist government. However, the proliferation threat is not as partisan an issue as it is sometimes portrayed. It was under a liberal administration in 2000 that the country secretly conducted a two-month long experiment in enriching uranium, and in 2017 President Moon’s own defense minister reportedly asked his US counterpart about the possibility of reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, with superpower competition on the rise,policymakers from both right and left who want to avoid choosingbetween Washington and Beijing may come to see the nuclear option asincreasingly appealing.

One answer to this problem is for Washington to reinforce its security guarantees to Seoul, thereby reducing the perceived need for South Korea to go it alone. However, amid alliance tensions over cost-sharing negotiations and widespread speculation that Washington may seek to withdraw some of its troops, that is easier said than done. At the same time, anti- nuclear advocates need to make a caseagainst all nuclear weapons, instead of relying on the US’ nuclear umbrella toprevent proliferation.

Non-proliferation advocates must step up attempts to win over a greater number of people to our side, gradually strengthening the country’s non-proliferation norm. Rational arguments are an important part of this, but activists should acknowledge that— psychologically speaking — humans are not purely motivated by logical reasoning. What is needed is persuasion that also appeals on an emotional level to the country’s public and foreign policy elite. As former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans has emphasized, ‘emotion will have to play a big part’ in arguing against the spread of nuclear weapons. One potential starting point for this approach is through a reexamination of Korea’s historyat the hands of the atom bomb.

Contrary to conventional accounts, Korea’s involvement with nuclear weapons did notbegin in 2006, when North Korea conducted itsfirst nuclear test. Nor did it start in the 1970s, when President ParkChung-hee attempted to develop South Korea’s own nuclearcapabilities. Nor did it start in 1958, when the US first deployed nuclearweapons to its peninsula bases. Nor, even, did it start in 1950, when Washington considered the use of nuclear weapons amid the turmoil of theKorean War. In fact, the clock began at 8.15am on August 6, 1945, when at least 20,000 Koreanshad their lives literally torn apart,their bodies scorched and seared by anuclearstrike on the Japanese city of Hiroshima.