HANKYOREH

APLN Vice Chair Chung-in Moon highlights that the decay of inter-Korean relations and US-Russia relations has become a major obstacle, and there is little chance of a turnaround in either of those relationships. Read the full article here.

The Russians also expressed serious reservations about South Korea’s independent sanctions and about Samsung Heavy Industries’ suspension of the production of hull blocks and tools and materials for 10 out of 15 liquefied natural gas tankers that it has contracted to build for a Russian shipyard — though Samsung has not officially canceled that contract yet.

The Russians were very put out by the cancellation of a show in Korea that would have featured dancers from Russia’s Bolshoi Ballet. They strongly emphasized the need to continue exchange on a social, cultural and person-to-person level.

While the question of whether Korea is providing lethal weapons to Russia’s enemies will fade after the war in Ukraine, the issues of Russia’s stronger ties and military cooperation with North Korea will continue even after the war. Trust between South Korea and Russia isn’t high enough to take Russia’s verbal assurances at face value.

Furthermore, these issues are complicated by the marked difference between the two countries’ perspectives on the North Korean nuclear issue. The Russian government is critical of the frequency and intensity of South Korea’s joint military exercises with the US, of the deployment of US strategic weapons on the Korean Peninsula, and of the Korean government’s development of its “kill chain” preemptive strike platform. Nor have the Russians bothered to conceal their keen anxiety over strengthening military cooperation between South Korea, the US and Japan.

Russia hasn’t cooperated with South Korea and the US on their existing sanctions regime against North Korea. Russia tends to regard sanctions against North Korea and sanctions against itself as part of the same package, leaving Seoul with even less wiggle room.

In the end, it’s too optimistic to expect that it will be possible to restore Seoul-Moscow relations once the war in Ukraine has concluded. The decay of inter-Korean relations and US-Russia relations has become a major obstacle, and there’s little chance of a turnaround in either of those relationships.

One thing that’s certain is that these diplomatic challenges can’t be resolved by a US-oriented pro-West policy alone.

Alongside South Korea’s big-picture foreign policy direction, we also need a more granular approach for individual countries that’s based on an accurate understanding of those countries. Integrating that kind of detail-oriented thinking is what’s needed to make the Yoon administration’s foreign policy goals more compelling.

Image: iStock/Oleksii Liskonih