Considering Malaysia’s emphasis on active diplomatic engagement, it is perhaps not surprising that the 2024 Malaysia-China joint statement indicated that the two sides “will launch the bilateral dialogue on the management of maritime issues as early as possible to foster maritime dialogue and cooperation.” Mainstream media might interpret such a bilateral maritime dialogue as playing into Beijing’s hand and not showing solidarity to a fellow ASEAN member, namely the Philippines, on regional maritime disputes.

However, from Malaysia’s point of view, the realities and approaches are never as straight or simple as portrayed by mainstream commentaries. To begin, Malaysia’s emphasis on active neutrality and its alliance-allergic stance mean that it disagrees with the Philippines’ alliance-centric approach to the multi-nation territorial problem. In addition, so long as Manila refuses to give up its claims over Sabah, a Malaysian state on the island of Borneo, it is unrealistic to expect Malaysia to support the Philippines and choose confrontation over cooperation vis-à-vis China regarding the current Philippines-China tensions in the South China Sea.

Most important, all politics is local. Given Malaysia’s domestic problems and the many enormous challenges the Anwar government is facing before the next general elections (by February 2028), the ruling elites probably judge that while a maritime dialogue will not be a principal nor sufficient platform to resolve the South China Sea problem, it is nonetheless a useful layer of risk management and a useful channel to give peace a chance. As a militarily weaker state in an increasingly uncertain external environment, Malaysia prioritizes the goals of preserving its sovereignty, exercising its agency to continue its energy exploration activities in the South China Sea, and concentrating on pressing domestic tasks while simultaneously avoiding armed conflict and big power entrapment.

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