APLN member Hoang Thi Ha co-writes a commentary with Pham Thi Phuong Thao on Taiwan’s growing economic links with Southeast Asia. They highlight that while Southeast Asian countries may not wield significant influence over cross-strait relations, their consistent signalling against the use of force is significant. In the event that Beijing considers employing force, it can anticipate minimal support from these countries.
Taiwan’s Pivot Toward SE Asia
Taiwan’s Investments to ASEAN and China (in US$ billion)
Sources: Department of Investment Review, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China; National Statistics. ASEAN 6 includes Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
The acceleration of Taiwan’s economic diversification is also evident in people-to-people exchanges. In tourism, 2022 saw a significant post-pandemic return of Southeast Asian tourists to Taiwan, accounting for 41.4 per cent of its total foreign arrivals. Taiwan has extended its visa-free entry policy for tourists from Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei for another year to July 2024. Another area where Taiwan’s economic future is deeply intertwined with Southeast Asia is in labour. The region accounts for the majority of over 760,000 legal migrant workers in Taiwan, the largest numbers coming from Indonesia (272,855), the Philippines (149,371), and Vietnam (263,263).
Given this growing economic interdependence, the stakes are high for Southeast Asian nations in the event of any contingency over the Taiwan Strait. According to the State of Southeast Asia (SSEA) 2024 Survey report by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 44.2 per cent of Southeast Asian respondents are concerned that hostilities in the Taiwan Strait could severely disrupt regional supply chains. Countries like Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia, which have substantial trade and investment links with Taiwan, are particularly apprehensive about such a scenario. Understandably, Indonesian, Vietnamese and Philippine respondents, whose countries send large numbers of migrant workers to Taiwan, expressed heightened concerns about the need for repatriation of their nationals in the event of a crisis.
As the potential economic fallouts from a cross-strait contingency would reverberate far beyond Taiwan, Southeast Asian countries consistently advocate for maintaining the status quo and avoiding the use of force. The SSEA survey findings in 2023 and 2024 yielded remarkably similar results on the question, “What should your country do if conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait?”. In the 2024 Survey, Southeast Asians’ primary choice is to oppose the use of force through diplomatic means (45.1 per cent). Conversely, “support for China” was the least favoured option (3.0 per cent). While Southeast Asian countries may not wield significant influence over cross-strait relations, their consistent signalling against the use of force is significant. In the event that Beijing considers employing force, it can anticipate minimal support from these countries.
Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation means that it would be logical for the island to expand economic ties with Southeast Asia. This is the most effective pathway to forge partnerships and secure tacit regional alignment in opposing the use of force over the Taiwan Strait. President Lai should thus persist with the NSP and advance the momentum of Taiwan’s growing economic links with Southeast Asia.
GLOBAL TAIWAN INSTITUTE - APLN member Elina Noor wrote about the impact of the Taipei's New Southbound Policy and future collaborative opportunities between Malaysia and Taiwan.
