WORKSHOP SUMMARY

Monday, October 21

Organised by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network

Supported and hosted by the Henrich Böll Stiftung

On October 21, the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) organised a roundtable with experts from South Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, to discuss regional views of the South Korean nuclear armament debate. The roundtable was hosted by the East Asia Office of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung in Seoul.

There is an urgent need to find new approaches to strengthen the taboo against nuclear armament in South Korea. A major argument against South Korea’s nuclear armament is the reaction of the international community and the consequences that Seoul would face if it were to go nuclear. Yet, few studies have examined how the international community beyond the United States, China, and North Korea would respond to South Korea’s nuclear armament. The workshop aimed to fill that gap, by seeking to understand the perspectives of four regional states: Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia, and the Philippines.

Papers with perspectives from these four countries will be prepared and published separately in a forthcoming volume.

South Korea and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

All papers and presentations touched to some extent on South Korea’s relationship with the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The roundtable discussion on South Korea’s nuclear armament and the non-proliferation regime revolved around two scenarios. In the first, the collapse of the regime would cause South Korea’s nuclear armament; in the second, South Korea’s nuclear armament would cause the collapse of the regime. There was no agreement on which scenario was more likely.

As one participant put it: “If there is no NPT, then South Korea’s nuclear armament would not be violating international law.” The response from the international community would therefore depend on the strength of the non-proliferation regime at the time of South Korea’s proliferation, and especially the US response to proliferation. The Philippine response, for example, would depend on the strength of the NPT regime, which underlined the urgent need to produce an outcome document at the 2026 RevCon, to show unity on the NPT.

One participant argued that South Korea would never proliferate without at least tacit support from the US, which would induce the collapse of the NPT regime. In this case, Japan would also consider nuclear armament, but as long as the NPT remained effective, Japan would not become another “nuclear domino”. Howeverm if South Korea’s proliferation set off a domino effect in Northeast Asia, there is a risk that it might also prompt countries in Southeast Asia to consider nuclear armament, and potentially undermine the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.

One participant argued that even if South Korea was to proliferate, it was very unlikely to withdraw from the NPT at all. Another expert went so far as to argue that South Korea could not legally withdraw through Article X, because the purpose of Article X had always been to incentivise countries to enter the treaty, not allow them to leave. This interpretation, the participant argued, had been turned into customary international law through the NPT’s indefinite extension in 1995.

On the domestic legal side, it was noted that only South Korea among the countries represented at the roundtable lacked a domestic law forbidding nuclear weapons acquisition. Mongolia, Philippines and Indonesia have all ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) through domestic legislation, and Japan’s three no-nuclear principles constitute a powerful legal obstacle to nuclear armament. Some argued that such a law was not necessary in South Korea (due to the customary international law argument outlined above), while others suggested that it might be useful to advocate for such a law. 

Crafting a messaging strategy 

A theme that tied together the discussion at the roundtable was the need for a coherent messaging strategy. How do we change our culture of nuclear weapons in South Korea? asked one participant. All participants agreed that an organised messaging strategy was necessary – disarmament education, in the words of one expert present. The pro-nuclear camp in South Korea has developed a very effective messaging strategy, leaning into simple arguments such as “only nuclear can deter nuclear.” Yet, appeals to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, or the NPT, could easily come off as esoteric or irrelevant to the general public. The need to develop an efficient counternarrative in South Korea was apparent, as the anti-nuclear movement in South Korea is fragmented, lacks organisation, and needs leadership. Japan, which has a multitude of disarmament organisations, and an umbrella organisation to coordinate them, provides stark contrast.

There was no agreement on the best way to approach this strategy: should it focus on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, the material impact on the lives of South Koreans in general, or the impact on the nuclear energy industry in particular, or the loss of national prestige that would result? Pros and cons of various messages were debated, and have been summarised below.

Humanitarian impact of nuclear conflict

There was much discussion about views on the humanitarian impact of nuclear conflict, especially on how views differ between South Korea and Japan.

Whereas the threat of sanctions could serve as a deterrent for South Korea going nuclear (if those threats are credibly backed by the UNSC), for Japan, going nuclear is not just about sanctions. The nuclear taboo is so strong that “it’s just unthinkable”, even for hawkish politicians. In Japan, viewing nuclear weapons from the perspective of humanitarian impact is not a cause championed by fringe idealists, but it functions as a key part of policy. By contrast, few Koreans – even fellow scholars – are aware of the TPNW, and neither are policymakers. Where in Japan, there is an active discussion about how to reconcile TPNW with the status as a US ally (something the Philippines has managed by only accepting conventional deterrence from the US), South Korea has not even discussed observer status at TPNW Meetings of State Parties. One expert suggested that there may be an active effort by the Korean government to prevent discussion on the issue, because of South Korea’s deep attachment to the nuclear umbrella.

It was noted that the voices of hibakusha have cultivated a nuclear taboo globally, and worked to deter against the use of nuclear weapons, as well as detering Japan from going nuclear. In this regard, cooperation between Japan and South Korea on humanitarian impacts has had some successes and could be a potential area for building further awareness-building in South Korea on humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons. When President Yoon visited Hiroshima in 2023, he made the first visit as head of state to the Korean victims’ memorial, which he did together with then-PM Kishida. Yoon also met with groups of Korean A-Bomb survivors. These A-Bomb Survivors, long stigmatised in Korea, have also become more active in recent years, through the TPNW process.

Recently, Japanese and Korean parliamentarians met at the South Korean National Assembly to discuss nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, with both ruling and opposition parties from both countries in attendance, as well as Japanese and Korean hibakusha. This meeting was the first of its kind, and the main topic was avoiding nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, and included presentations on nuclear disarmament and disarmament education. Although the meeting did not directly broach the South Korean nuclear debate, it showed that improving relations between South Korea and Japan open up possibilities for people-to-people and exchanges between senior politicians. More inter-parliamentarian discussions were urged, and more focus on inclusive security dialogues. The Indonesian government, which recently ratified the TPNW just as it came to power, could encourage both South Korea and Japan to engage with the TPNW as observers, as part of efforts to strengthen the nuclear taboo in the respective countries.

Material costs of going nuclear

Participants noted the costs that international sanctions would impose on South Korea, making comparisons with the major hardships endured by North Korea. Major export sectors such as automobiles and semi-conductors would be affected; South Korea’s energy mix is supported by 30% nuclear power, which would be negatively affected after existing uranium supplies shrunk, or were diverted for weapons usage; gas prices, food, travel visas, and many other conveniencies that South Koreans have grown used to would become prohibitively expensive. One participant stated that it was “irresponsible” of the South Korean president to bring up nuclear armament, without also mentioning such consequences.

However, another participant argued that South Korea might not be so negatively affected in the economic sense. They suggested that it is very unlikely to get sanctioned for an enduring amount of time, and made the comparison with India, which was only temporarily sanctioned. Regional states would likely compartmentalise economic issues from the nuclear issue, given mutual economic interests. Others retorted that the case of India was not so instructive, because India was excluded – and remains excluded – from the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. In the Indian case, other sanctions were lifted in the context of war on terror, and it took years to push the issue through the US congress, during which time the US also consulted closely with Japan.

The impact on South Korea’s nuclear industry

It was agreed that South Korea’s nuclear energy industry would suffer heavily from South Korea going nuclear. Already, there is a split in South Korea between the parts of the security community, who argue for maintenance of nuclear latency in order to reduce future breakout time, and the nuclear power industry, which opposes that messaging because it complicates its ability to advocate for enhanced nuclear enrichment and reprocessing for nuclear waste purposes.

Some in South Korea look to Japan as an ideal case of nuclear latency, given its existing reprocessing capabilities, but the Japanese case may not be so ideal at all: after the Fukushima disaster, public support for nuclear latency fell, and the nuclear fuel recycling policy has become a contentious political and public issue. The construction of the Rokkasho Reprocessing plant is still underway, and many questions are being raised on its economic and political utility.

If South Korea wants nuclear latency, one expert argued, it needs to make it clear to the world that it will not be used for nuclear weapons. There was no consensus on how South Korea could provide such assurances. In the case of Japan, it is politically useful to appeal to the taboo on nuclear weapons, and the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to convince the world that reprocessing is commercially driven, and that Japan has no nuclear weapon ambitions. In South Korea, the debate on reprocessing and comparisons with Japan, have played up a victim complex that is unhelpful to South Korea for making such assurances, especially in combination with vocal public support for nuclear weapons.

One way for anti-nuclear activists to push back against the pro-nuclear camp’s attempts to appropriate nuclear latency capabilities could be to reframe the issue from “nuclear latency” to “pro-energy security”, emphasising to the Korean public and international observers the commitment to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Simultaneously, the detrimental effects that nuclear armament would have on the nuclear industry would need to be communicated more clearly to the public.

Reputational costs of going nuclear

There was agreement that South Korea’s international status would be negatively impacted by nuclear acquisition. In public polling, it was noted, South Korea’s international prestige and status, was given equal weight with the need to deter North Korea, underlining the need to focus public messaging on how nuclear armament would damage South Korea’s international status.

North Korea’s status as international pariah was proof to many participants that South Korea could suffer a similar fate. Southeast Asian countries, who reject all nuclear weapons, would not make any distinction between South Korean and North Korean nuclear weapons, although Southeast Asian countries maintain cordial relations with North Korea and would likely do so with South Korea as well. One participant suggested that, if South Korea declared that it would withdraw from the NPT, the breakout time would still offer a window for consultation or dialogue with Southeast Asian countries. Southeast Asia’s vocal support for the international nonproliferation regime could be meaningful to the South Korean government.

It was suggested that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) had been underutilised as a means of bridging dialogue between Southeast and Northeast Asia. For example, the existing Philippines-Australia working group under ARF on non-proliferation and nuclear risk reduction has not focused on the Korean Peninsula. The fact that North Korea is part of ARF makes it one of the few potential forums for inter-Korean dialogue in the region, in addition to the Ulaanbataar Dialogue and Process, hosted by Mongolia.

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The opinions articulated above represent the views of individual experts, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network or any of its members, nor do they represent the views of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung. APLN’s website is a source of authoritative research and analysis and serves as a platform for debate and discussion among our senior network members, experts, and practitioners, as well as the next generation of policymakers, analysts, and advocates. Comments and responses can be emailed to apln@apln.network.