The concept of nuclear justice has long existed in communities affected by nuclear weapons, yet its realisation remains elusive. The entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has been instrumental in shedding much-needed light on the role of international law and the international community in addressing issues such as victim assistance and environmental remediation for all those affected by past nuclear tests and uses. This webinar explored policy priorities and recommendations that can bring us closer to realizing nuclear justice, especially concerning victim assistance and environmental remediation.

Presenters:

Becky Alexis-Martin,
Lecturer or Peace and International Development at the University of Bradford
@MysteriousDrBex

Monalisa Hazarika
UN Youth Champion for Disarmament
@mona_haza

Ruairí Devereaux-Heddon
Independent researcher specializing in international law and humanitarian disarmament
@HeddonRuairi

Ekaterina Lapanovich
Senior Lecturer at Ural Federal University
@kat_lapanovich

Discussants:

Anaïs Maurer
Assistant Professor of French and Comparative Literature at Rutgers University
@MaurerAnais

Ian Fleming Zhou
PhD candidate at the University of Pretoria
@IanFlemingVIP

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Presenters

Monalisa Hazarika:

Today, I would like to talk briefly about the complex history of the impact of uranium mining, especially on indigenous communities and native lands, which has not been in the vein of focus within the broader nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament discourse, but warrants our attention while talking about nuclear justice. While the focus has primarily been on the most visible parts of the life cycle of nuclear weapons or reactors, there has been surprisingly little discussion concerning the production of the radioactive raw material–from the preliminary exploration of the uranium deposits to the final packaging of uranium oxide–which seems to be under the radar.

This highly contested element has been at the spectrum ends of the resource curse depending on the bane or boon narrative but the resultant patterns of inequitable pollution distribution as the result of policy and legal decisions pretty much seem like a packaged deal. Contemporary manifestations of these exclusionary practices are no longer overt, evident through housing discrimination, targeting of low-income communities for polluting operations, under-representation in policy and legal spheres, unequal distribution of benefits, lesser pay for the same work, practices of hiring “unskilled workers” and flown in and out (FIFO) workforce to weaken the worker solidarity, which are just some of the examples. Further, on the health aspect, the mutagenic diseases induced by low-level radiation appear only after a long period of cumulative effects, and often after contact with the radioactive substance had ceased.

Given the fact that an estimated 70% of the world’s uranium deposits were found on native lands, their extraction and exploitation in the name of ‘national defense’ points to the inherent ‘radioactive colonialism’ that stands in stark contrast to the protection of human rights and the environment. Native communities globally often find themselves at the crosshairs of “strategic power grabs” and have been historically falling behind in nuclear waste remediation, especially when it comes to speed and adequacy. The asymmetrical power distributions, misinterpretation of the legacy of radioactive contamination, and whitewashing of historically disadvantageous experiences by decision-makers by dodging their issues on the grounds that “no single source” of contamination could be established, have left a toxic legacy for generations to come. The ardent neglect and abandonment of these groups are reflected in the inequitable distribution of pollution, backed by biased policies that side-line their experiences to fulfil the priorities of those in power. Their traditional knowledge is discounted as “wishful thinking” and “emotional hotchpotch” not aligned with the current anarchic world politics.

From the Navajo Nation in the United States to the tribal plains of Jaduguda in India, the lives of indigenous communities worldwide have been severely impacted by the nuclear weapons industry, including uranium mining, milling, enrichment, and nuclear waste storage and disposal. An example of a lesser-known case is in India’s northeast where in the village of Domiasiat (located in the state of Meghalaya), 9.22 million tons of high-grade uranium ore deposits were found by the Atomic Minerals Directorate of India under its  ‘KPM Uranium Mining Project’ conducted from the 1970s to 1980s. While the project didn’t go through due to massive opposition, the exploratory mining resulted in over 650 tonnes of contaminated tailings which were left unprotected at the mining sites and later covered by concrete pits. When the reports of leakages were revealed, a local environmental researcher documented the botched job back in 2020 where his Geiger Counter recorded ionizing radiation of 1,093 counts per minute and radiation levels fluctuating between 235 and 315 counts per minute in other areas, pointing at the irreversible damage that has already been done.

Having an understanding of some of the fundamental concepts of environmental racism and justice is essential to recognize the disproportionate burden of nuclear pollution and contribute to the discussions around nuclear justice. I think as researchers or activists, it would be interesting to look at scientific studies and research on not just environmental and occupational impact but also birth and reproductive health outcomes to radioactive exposure and explore how that relates to victim assistance and environmental remediation. So, finding ways to utilize and streamline the limited and often inconsistent data for policy considerations in the nuclear sphere would be incredibly useful.

Policy priorities and recommendations—increasing technical assistance and funding to assess potentially contaminated sites by developing a concrete action plan and inclusion of indigenous people in national and international diplomacy and policymaking spaces to address the root cause of these injustices. Incorporating the reported lessons onto the agenda for remediation and rehabilitation will go a long way towards reducing the marginalization experiences and devolving the power structures. Above all maintaining relationships with community stakeholders based on respect, understanding, patience, and a willingness to listen and exchange knowledge and ideas are crucial to negotiating support for projects, and for the creation of shared value.

Ruarí Devereaux-Heddon:

What is nuclear justice?

Nuclear Justice is a broad concept which can have varied understandings and varied responses depending on the situation. In the context of the NPT for example, many states would argue that there is a great nuclear injustice built-in. While the Treaty is silent on the damage caused by nuclear weapons, the haves/have nots regime and the lack of progress on Article 6 Disarmament obligations leaves many states unhappy with this perceived unjust system.

However, on a global scale, the greatest nuclear injustice which has taken place is to those communities and environments affected by nuclear testing and nuclear weapons use. The catastrophic effects of these weapons are, despite efforts from nuclear powers, now well documented. In the over 2000 tests of these weapons and 2 uses in conflict, there have been countless deaths, long term and multi-generational illnesses, trauma, social and economic exclusion, and displacement. The effects on the environment are no less catastrophic, with extensive contamination of vegetation, water sources, and wildlife. The impact of radioactive material in the environment is long-lasting and widespread and can leave large areas uninhabitable, such as the Northern Atolls of the Marshall Islands.

For too long, there has been no meaningful recognition on an international level of this damage, and efforts to achieve nuclear justice have been fractured and ineffective. However, it must be recognised that in recent years there has been a shift in the narrative from one of national security, sovereignty, and non-proliferation, to one where victims, including the ‘silent victim’; the environment, are being recognised more and more as being impacted, and that they matter.

Nuclear Justice as a Human Rights Issue:

This is clear not just from developments in humanitarian disarmament such as the TPNW, but in growing efforts within the human rights fora, where calls for nuclear justice have also grown in recent years. Civil society organisations such as Basel Peace Office and World Future Council increase calls for states to respect their Article 6 ICCPR obligations to the right to life, as well as other obligations including the right to health, humane treatment, and a healthy environment.

[General Comment no.36 of the UN Human Rights Committee on Article 6 ICCPR affirms the right to life is non-derogable, and applies at all times. This is also supported by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case.]

The Human Rights Council has even had special resolutions on the impact of nuclear testing, the so-called ‘cancer of nuclear legacy’ on the Marshallese and their human rights. Increasingly, we see that nuclear justice is not just a disarmament law or an IHL issue, but has increasingly grown to include international human rights law, and potentially even international environment law. The normative framework has expanded and increasingly what is considered nuclear justice has expanded with it to include those affected.

The TPNW and its Positive Obligations:

This increased humanitarian and human rights focus can be seen perhaps most clearly in the TPNW. This Treaty includes positive obligations codified in international law under Article 6 on victim assistance and environmental remediation. This recognises the growing inclusion of those who have for years been excluded from the discussion on nuclear weapons, the victims.

These positive obligations have contributed hugely to a normative shift, including most recently in a Resolution of the UNGA 1st Committee, but also in the last NPT REVCON, where for the first time ever, positive obligations, and as such nuclear justice, were considered for inclusion in the disarmament pillar, with language unopposed until the entire report failed to gain consensus.

Victim Assistance:

Victim Assistance is of crucial importance in the fight for nuclear justice. For too long have victims been marginalized, ignored, and isolated as they suffer from the horrific consequences of these weapons. Under Article 6(1); states parties agree to provide ‘adequate assistance’ to those affected by nuclear weapons testing and use, but what does this actually look like in practice and how can these efforts contribute to nuclear justice?

One of the places worst affected by nuclear weapons testing, which actually has a victim assistance regime was that of the United States. Fortunately, RECA is currently in a process of re-evaluation, with a new bi-partisan bill being proposed. This expansion can act as an indicator as to where RECA in its current form has failed, and potentially offer some indicators as to what else a victim assistance regime should contain.

The initial RECA act has been greatly criticised. RECA offers compensation for ‘claims relating to atmospheric nuclear testing and uranium industry employment’. Claimants do not need to establish causation. Rather they qualify if they can prove the diagnosis of a LISTED compensable disease after working or residing in a designated area for a specific period of time. Many people are still excluded including downwinders of Trinity, and many civilian populations in the Pacific. It comprises a lump sum payment, which is paid to all affected, not adjusted for inflation, and not individual specific.

The reform of RECA seeks to expand the number of states who can gain access, and also to expand the spectrum of conditions who qualify, including patients who suffer from chronic lymphocytic leukemia and other chronic kidney diseases.

But is this enough? Arguably no.

A victim assistance regime which can effectuate nuclear justice must be one that is inclusive in nature, consulting affected communities, IOs, civil society, and all stakeholders about the priorities for them, (Article 19 Vienna Action Plan). It must be gender and age sensitive. It should be determined on an individual basis and it should be non-discriminate. It should be transparent, and should be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure its effectiveness. It must also be in line with IHL, IHRL. As well as this, it should incorporate the sharing of best practices and resources between states, in line with Article 7 on international cooperation and assistance. RECA in its current form, and arguably also in its proposed reform, does not go far enough to reach these goals.

Environmental Remediation:

Environmental Remediation is another key element of nuclear justice. When nuclear weapons are used or tested, the short and long term effects they can have on the environment can be devastating. Nuclear fallout and the results of thermal radiation can render large tracts of land unusable, interfering with the ability to grow crops and raise livestock, leading to Foodchain disruption. This can have secondary impacts of interfering with livelihoods, and even health – Marshall Islands.

Efforts to undertake Environmental Remediation are carried out for a number of reasons; notably; – 1. Sets a norm to those outside the TPNW, 2. Respects IHL prohibition on methods or means of warfare intended/expected to damage the environment, 3. Aligns with other humanitarian treaties, 4. Respects the humanitarian goal of the TPNW – to reduce suffering from the use or testing of nuclear weapons.

But what is ER and how can it form a component of nuclear justice?

Terminology: What is interesting in this obligation is the use of the term ‘remediation’ by the drafters. This separates it from other NWFZ treaties such as the Semipalatinsk treaty, whereby the term ‘Rehabilitation’ was used. The term rehabilitation implies that there is an expectation that the site should be rehabilitated entirely to its former status. This indicates a shift in thinking by the drafters, and an overall shift in understanding of the impact of these weapons on the environment. ‘Remediation’ recognises that the impact of radiation on the environment, on the ecosystem and on the flora and fauna, including people, living in these affected areas may mean that it is impossible to truly ‘rehabilitate’ these environments back to how they once were. Instead, Remediation recognises that this must be an evolving goal, which may require us to think not just in terms of decades, but in terms of hundreds if not thousands of years, and even then; the damage caused may render it impossible to return to the state that once was.

The terms ‘cleanup’ ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘restoration’ may imply that the conditions that prevailed prior to contamination can be restored, so were not chosen for the TPNW. “Environmental Remediation”, however, can help reduce levels of radiation, prevent radioactive materials from migrating, and minimize the contact that humans have with such contamination. This sentiment is echoed also in the Preamble; “catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed”.  Text of Article 6(2); Each State Party, …shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated.

The difficulty posed in in remedying the damage caused by nuclear weapons and irradiated material is arguably the clearest element to separate nuclear weapons from other humanitarian disarmament treaties. The geographical and temporal scope of nuclear material is hard to predict and long lasting. However, there is definitely a lot that can be learned from other treaties, such as the Cluster Munitions Convention. Which, in its Article 4 on Clearance and Risk Reduction Education provides useful guidance in many respects, especially on the importance of education.

As well as this, the International Atomic Energy Agency has provided useful guidance for states on how to conduct environmental remediation of areas which are contaminated specifically with nuclear radiation.

Arguably, together, these should offer guidance on an environmental remediation regime which can effectuate nuclear justice. Some of these include the importance of 1. Planning Remediation operations and setting clearly defined goals and objectives, 2. Using appropriate Method Selection given the circumstances (Chemical/Physical/Separation/Solidification/ Vitrificaton/ Containment), 3. Optimization throughout the process, 4. Documenting and Reporting all activities and progress in a Transparent Manner, 5. Inclusivity of all affected parties throughout, with Sensitivities to gender, age, disability, diversity, 6. Civilian Protection, including through integrated Education, 7. Independent Regulation of efforts, 8. Collaboration with other States parties, 9. Long-Term Management.

Ekaterina Lapanovich:

Before going to my remarks, I would like to thank the APLN and BASIC for organizing this important and timely discussion. And thank you to my fellow speakers for their valuable insights. In my remarks I will try to approach the issue we are discussing today from an angle a bit different from that of my colleagues.

Given that my state, Russia, is a nuclear-weapon state, answering the first question for our webinar (=what is nuclear justice), I will focus not on what nuclear justice is but how is that to provide nuclear justice. And I must say that my focus will primarily be on the issue of justice in relations between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states.

To provide nuclear justice ideally means to act upon a reflective understanding that the production of nuclear deterrence was and is systematically accompanied by the production of risks and hazards. Practically it means to respond to what Chris Reus-Smith and Ayşe Zarakol call “polymorphic claims of justice” that interact and intersect in complex ways in the international system. Among those identified by the authors are six such claims: recognitional, distributive, institutional, historical, epistemic, and, finally, intergenerational.

In my remarks I am not going to dissect nuclear justice as I truly believe that really great job was done by great experts around the world. I already mentioned Chris Reus-Smith and Ayşe Zarakol’s classification which I find helpful despite the fact it is not nuclear-centered. Among the most recent pieces is that written by Rebecca Davis Gibbons as a part of UNIDIR’s “From the Margins to the Mainstream. Advancing Intersectional Gender Analysis in Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. In her piece she states that one of the most common justice mechanisms sought by victims in their testimonials is policy change that would make sure no one else would suffer as victims of the use and testing did. A change towards reducing or eliminating the chance of nuclear use or testing would be “the ultimate form of acknowledgement” and it would help repair relationships in society.

In an attempt to answer the other question for our webinar which is why nuclear justice is essential I will again approach the following way: why and how policy change is essential for nuclear-weapon states and how it is in their interest to provide justice. I do focus on interest here as I believe that it is the way to approach it while promoting it to nuclear-weapon states.  So, nuclear-weapon states should be worried about the deep crisis of the global nuclear order and its cornerstone, the NPT, which I see as not just yet another crisis. To mitigate that and repair relationships they should address legitimate concerns that the order has always been unjust and is becoming increasingly so. I do anticipate some criticism of that approach, along the lines that nuclear justice should not be the subject of inter-state bargaining, but I still think that if we aim at forging a policy change in relationships between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states suffered from testing it is not unreasonable to focus on that framework.

The following questions raised for the panel are, firstly, which policies need to be pushed urgently for realising nuclear justice, especially concerning victim assistance and environmental remediation and, secondly, which international instruments and arrangements are most important for pursuing nuclear justice?

On the side of nuclear-weapon states, a policy that needs to be pursued is that of engagement with and non-dismissal of the issue. I do understand that that is very generic and that is the basics but we still do not, unfortunately, have that on the side of nuclear-weapon states in their relationships with NNWS suffered. Referring one more time to the idea of nuclear disarmament as the form of acknowledgement I would like to highlight the following developments. The topic of victim assistance and environmental remediation did get some traction at the last NPT Preparatory Committee in Vienna with a number of states – including nuclear allied states – called for engagement on the subject. Kazakhstan and Kiribati also tabled the working paper on nuclear testing in which they called nuclear-weapon states for engagement and information sharing. Importantly, they also said it would help to ease tensions on the NPT and demonstrate disarmament commitment. I do believe that this linkage should stay as it is a workable way to go with nuclear-weapon states. And I believe that issues of victim assistance and environmental remediation should definitely be raised within the NPT framework.

As for instruments and arrangements suitable for deliberations on victim assistance and environmental remediation at the inter-state level, I believe that a multilateral inclusive –meaning NWS aboard – ideal framework to deal with nuclear justice is nether feasible nor even needed as it just won’t be functional. There is a good reason to suppose that for some states – mine included – a feasible, maybe the only feasible if at all, way to go is to deal with that sensitive issues bilaterally. To add to the feasibility point, it seems that for some nuclear-weapon states (again, mine included) engagement on environmental remediation may be more likely than victim assistance because of its being less sensitive for a nuclear-weapon state. As for Russia there is some basis for cooperation with affected states on the matter. I mean efforts on environmental remediation in states affected by uranium mining and processing, the program on Recultivation of territories of states impacted by uranium-mining industry was implemented together with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States. It was launched in 2013 for the duration of 10 years. As for Kyrgyzstan, plans to develop new bilateral assistance programs lasting until the 2030s are already in place. As for Kazakhstan, and remediation of territories affected by nuclear testing, the recent establishment of the Semipalatinsk nuclear safety zone to, inter alia, “rehabilitate the territory of the former Semipalatinsk nuclear test site” provides Russia with an opportunity of engagement. That sort of engagement is reasonable and is unlikely to negatively affect Russia’s strategic interests and security concerns, so it is worth pursuing.

Even though in my previous remarks I focused entirely on the inter-state segment, I do believe that other frameworks are not less valuable and may, actually, be more feasible. With my friends and colleagues Laura Lepsy from Germany and Alain Ponce Blancas from Mexico we co-authored an article on redressing the legacy of nuclear testing for Arms Control Today that was out in January. In this article we promote the idea about convening a conference on the legacy of nuclear testing, the one with a rather data-based technical outlook. It should be framed primarily as a forum for technical experts, scientists, and practitioners as well as non-governmental interest groups that are ready to, inter alia, exchange best practices on, inter alia, environmental remediation. Among participants might be lab people and those from specialized agencies like the DoE and Rosatom from nuclear-weapon states. From non-nuclear-weapon states suffered from testing – organizations that oversee and decontaminate former test sites such as the National Nuclear Center in Kazakhstan.

The year of 2026, the CTBT’s 30th anniversary year, would be a good rallying point for that sort of initiative. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization itself might also be interested to engage since the conference might help to reinforce the global testing moratorium, promote CTBT’s entry into force and generate support for CTBTO’s International Monitoring System. One significant challenge is that the Preparatory Commission’s engagement on the issue is likely to be viewed by some as its alignment with the TPNW and its supporters. We believe that the remediation and assistance issue we propose to put to the forefront is a part of a wider humanitarian agenda that should not be treated “as a battlefield for opposing ideological views” but instead pursued as an evidence-based discussion.

In closing, I would also like to add that providing nuclear justice is not only the responsibility of states and not only something to be addressed at high-level or whatever level conferences or through technical cooperation mechanisms – it is our shared responsibility as members of the international community. Whereas it is only for states to provide some forms of justice (through apology, compensation mechanisms, etc.), we, members of the international community, may provide some others. A crucial role here to be played by those doing teaching or being engaged in educational and awareness-raising initiatives, especially in nuclear-weapon states. Through covering nuclear justice-related topics in our activities we contribute to redressing historical and epistemic injustices so that nuclear history is no longer whitewashed and victims are no longer invisible.

Discussants

Anaïs Maurer:

What form should nuclear justice take? Antinuclear activists are not asking for retributive justice. Nobody is trying to punish the perpetrators. The antinuclear movement seeks reparative justice: it asks to repair the harm done to the victims. But the global scale of nuclear imperialism raises several issues.

First, who are the victims? The nuclear industrial complex has inflicted disproportionate harm on colonized people, and on Indigenous communities in particular. Nuclear victims in these communities are not limited to people suffering from radiation-induced diseases. Near uranium mines, nuclear testing sites, nuclearized military bases, and nuclear plants, all of which are overwhelmingly located on Indigenous and/or colonized land, the nuclear industrial complex has far reaching consequences. The nuclear industry brings with it the violent dislocation of people and their land; it brings economic changes by compelling communities to turn to a nuclear-dependent economy; it brings cultural changes with the mass migration of military workers in nuclear-affected communities. In addition to this large geographic scope comes a long temporal scope. Nuclear victims include past generations and the thousands of stillborn and miscarried babies who were never born. It also includes future victims, as mitogenic diseases will continue to spread for decades or centuries. It also affects other-than-humans, from the fish killed by nuclear blast to the birds blinded by the bombs. Nuclear injustice constitutes a total social fact, and it can only be addressed by what Becky Alexis-Martin calls “paranuclear justice.”

The next question is, who are the perpetrators? Is it just nuclear weapons states’ presidents? The nuclear engineers who participate in nuclear imperialism? The enrolled military personnel or the proletarian workforce working on the nuclear sites, many of whom did not have a much of a choice in the matter? The journalists who did not cover these injustices? Everyone across the world who did not contest the nuclear industrial complex? As Monalisa Hazariza notes, to some extent, we are all perpetrators, because we live in a society that let nuclear injustices happen and that has been unable to redress nuclear harms. Nuclear justice is therefore a transnational and transgenerational quest for reparative justice. Everyone has a role to play: as Ekaterina Lapanovich argues, nuclear justice cannot be delivered exclusively by States: ordinary people also have a responsibility, as educators, voters, and activists.

Reparative justice consists of three main steps taken by the perpetrators: offering apologies, delivering reparations, and ensuring future accountability. None of these steps are currently being taken on a significant scale. Most nuclear weapons states have not presented their apologies to nuclear victims. What would constitute an acceptable form of apology for such crimes anyways? The Clinton’s administration apology, for example, consisted of a one-time statement, when apologizing should be an ongoing process inscribing nuclear crimes in global memory. It should also lead to the next step of reparative justice: reparations.

But what form should reparations take? Ruairí Devereaux-Heddon’s intervention details the limits of victim assistance as currently implemented. Too many categories of people are still excluded from the right to claim compensation. Too many medical conditions do not give rights to reparations. The overall process lacks transparency and leaves victims with a feeling of powerlessness. And current nuclear reparations programs keep many communities of nuclear victims in a situation of continued economic dependency towards former colonizers, perpetuating problematic neocolonial power dynamics. Environmental remediation is not any less fraught. No “clean up” is possible: the radioactive poison cannot be cleaned, it can only be transferred somewhere else, at great human, environmental, and economic cost.

Given the unique and long-lasting destructiveness of the nuclear industrial complex, it is impossible to properly compensate nuclear victims for their loss and to rehabilitate the land destroyed by nuclear harm. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that perpetrators commit to never perpetrate such crimes ever again. In that respect, the path forward is clear: advocating for and abiding by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), ensuring that this arsenal of mass destruction is dismantled and eradicated. As Ekaterina Lapanovich puts it, abolishing nuclear weapons would constitute the ultimate form of accountability.

When it comes to nuclear justice, we should dream big. We should not think about what seems and does not seem “realistic.” Because they will take care of curtailing our dreams when we sit at the negotiation table. In the end, it is as unrealistic and utopian to think that we can achieve true nuclear justice, as it is to think that nuclear crimes can be perpetrated without accountability.

Ian Fleming Zhou:

It’s truly remarkable that we’re having this discussion today, especially in light of the recent developments that have taken place. Just a month ago, the US Senate approved a significant bill to broaden and prolong the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act. And let’s not forget the diplomatic breakthrough that occurred in late 2023, when the UNGA considered a resolution specifically focused on addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons. Titled “Addressing the Legacy of Nuclear Weapons,” this resolution recognizes the importance of providing victim assistance and environmental remediation to member states affected by nuclear weapons. It’s a significant step forward in acknowledging the needs of those who have been impacted by nuclear testing and use, and it demonstrates a growing commitment on the international stage to confront these challenges head-on.

The presentations by the speakers illustrate  the importance of broadening our perspectives on nuclear justice. From Monalisa’s focus on the sourcing of nuclear fuel is a critical aspect that often receives less attention in discussions around nuclear justice. It is essential to prioritize this issue as part of our broader efforts to address the social, environmental, and ethical implications of nuclear power generation. Ruari’s exploration of nuclear justice as a human rights issue and Ekatarina’s focus on the responsibilities of NWS offer complementary insights into the multifaceted nature of this complex issue. This further enriches our understanding of nuclear justice by highlighting the interconnectedness of various justice claims and the need for a more inclusive approach.

Intersectionality: Speakers have emphasized the intersectionality of nuclear justice, acknowledging its connections to broader issues such as human rights, environmental protection, and geopolitical power dynamics. This recognition of the interconnectedness of various justice claims is crucial for developing holistic approaches to addressing nuclear injustices.

Global South Perspective: Ekatarina’s acknowledgment of her perspective as an individual from the global South highlights the importance of centering marginalized voices in discussions on nuclear justice. Her insights serve as a reminder that the current nuclear order perpetuates inequalities that disproportionately affect NNWS, and any efforts towards nuclear justice must prioritize the interests and concerns of these nations.

Policy Implications: The presentations have raised important questions about the policy implications of nuclear justice, particularly in terms of victim assistance, environmental remediation, and engagement between NWS and NNWS. Moving forward, it will be essential to translate these theoretical discussions into concrete policy actions that address the needs and aspirations of affected communities.

Collaborative Action: Finally, the speakers have emphasized the need for collaborative action and dialogue to advance nuclear justice. Whether through bilateral engagement, multilateral frameworks, or technical conferences, there is a consensus that meaningful progress requires the participation and cooperation of all stakeholders, including states, civil society, and international organizations.

In conclusion, this discussion has provided valuable insights into the complexities of nuclear justice and the pathways towards a more equitable and sustainable nuclear order. By centering the voices of affected communities, recognizing the intersectionality of justice claims, and fostering collaboration between NWS and NNWS, we can strive towards a future where nuclear justice is not just an aspiration but a reality for all. The question that I have however, is whether during your research you saw the intersection of colonialism, the nuclear order and this issue we are discussing? OR In considering the historical legacy of nuclear weapons testing and use, how do we address the inherent coloniality within the nuclear order, and what steps can be taken to ensure that discussions on nuclear justice prioritize the voices and needs of marginalized communities disproportionately affected by colonial-era nuclear activities?