In Defence of the Status Quo: Stabilising Cross-Strait Relations under the Lai Ching-Te Administration
Special Reports

In Defence of the Status Quo: Stabilising Cross-Strait Relations under the Lai Ching-Te Administration

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Executive summary

How will cross-strait relations evolve under the Lai Ching-Te administration amidst quickly increasing cross-strait tensions? Will Taiwan’s new national leader be able to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait by continuing to abide by the principles of maintaining status quo? This report seeks to analyse how the 2024 presidential election result and the Taiwanese public’s changing views towards its relations with China (and particularly, the unification with China) are likely to affect regional stability, considering recent developments following Lai’s inauguration.

The Taiwanese elections have re-shaped Taiwan’s political landscape, creating a three-party parliament and the first no-majority government in sixteen years. President Lai has a record of pro-independence views, but the new majority in the Legislative Yuan has the potential to balance those views to some extent, and has sought to pursue unofficial dialogues with the Mainland. China has reacted strongly to the election of Lai and sought to influence the election results through military, economic, diplomatic, and disinformation campaigns, and also issued stern warnings at US support for Lai.

Meanwhile, a leading opinion survey, conducted by the Election Research Center (ERC) at the National Cheng Chi University (NCCU), revealed strong support for maintaining the status quo. The survey shows slowly declining support for the option “maintaining status quo, move towards independence” (22.4%) since 2020, and the highest support for “maintaining status quo indefinitely” (33.6%) since the survey was first conducted in 1994. The divergence is notable, because in 2020, both options received equal support. The survey also finds support for “maintaining status quo and decide at later date” (27.3%) since 1996, as well as the lowest support for “unification as soon as possible” (1.1%) since 1994. The change of Taiwanese attitudes since 2020 reflects a desire to prioritise stability over independence.

The Taiwan issue lies at the core of US-China relations. The future of cross-strait relations will have a significant impact on peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific and the world. In the past two decades, when US-China relations were smooth, cross-strait relations usually moved in a positive direction. Conversely, when US-China relations became less stable, cross-strait relations also became difficult. As long as China believes that the United States is supporting Taiwan’s independence, China will inevitably stand ready to react strongly. China’s strong reaction to the visit of then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in 2022 is evidence of this fact.

Immediately after Pelosi’s visit, ASEAN states issued a Foreign Ministers’ Statement expressing their concerns and calling for “maximum restraint.” Most ASEAN states have a huge stake in the Taiwan Strait, not only because China is their largest export market or import source, but also because of people to people exchanges, trade, and investment activities with Taiwan, including a large presence of foreign laborers.

After Pelosi’s visit in Taiwan in August 2022 and China’s extensive military drills in the Taiwan Strait, fears of supply chain disruption have emerged among Taiwan’s trade partners, including ASEAN states, Japan, and Europe. An increasing number of companies have urged their suppliers or contract manufacturers in Taiwan to consider a “Taiwan + 1” strategy to extend supply chains outside Taiwan with the objective of achieving de-risking.

A particular aspect of supply chain disruption which has received much attention is that of Taiwan’s leading role as a semiconductor manufacturer. It has been suggested that this serves as a “Silicon Shield” and could act as a strong deterrent to China. However, some have drawn the opposite conclusion, arguing that control over the strategic industry serves as an incentive for invasion.

The report suggests that, as international supply chains shift and the security situation around Taiwan develops, the ‘Silicon Shield’ may not protect Taiwan from a Chinese attack. Focus must instead lie on self-restraint and constructive dialogue, to ease tensions across the Taiwan Strait and maintain the status quo. The report makes several recommendations to this end.

Resume cross-strait dialogues to avoid escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait

  • Taipei and Beijing should both send positive signals to resume dialogues, possibly starting with the resumption of tourism or the exchange of degree students.
  • The United States can play an important role in encouraging dialogue while reassuring both parties that it does not intend to take any action that would force a change in the status quo.
  • Regional states like Singapore and South Korea may consider creating a platform for cross-strait conversations and encouraging self-restraint.

Ensure correct understanding of Taiwanese support for the status quo and Lowest interests in independence, and explore an innovative theory to replace the 1992 Consensus

  • China should recognise the Taiwanese public’s low interest in seeking independence, and the two sides should consider exploring approaches to maintaining a “permanent status quo.”
  • China needs to better understand the evolving sentiment in Taiwan, particularly the rejection of independence following developments since the 1992 Consensus and China’s broken promise of “One Country, Two System” in Hong Kong.
  • The new majority in the Legislative Yuan should set up a special committee to review domestic views on independence and host policy debates aimed at gradually finding a consensus on how to maintain the status quo, which reflects the will of the Taiwanese people.
  • Scholars should conduct surveys of the one million Southeast Asian nationals – migrant workers, foreign spouses, and international students – in Taiwan to understand their views of the issue of independence, status quo, and unification, to underscore the stake that ASEAN countries have in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Increase joint efforts to deter Chinese use of force and assist Taiwan’s meaningful international participation

  • Countries and groupings, such as the QUAD, G7, OECD, and EU, should work to deter China from conducting a military invasion of Taiwan by warning China of the extremely high costs of unilateral change to the status quo.
  • Countries and international organisations sharing common interests with Taiwan should assist it in joining public health or economic organisations or mechanisms. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) members should deter political interference in assessing new members’ applications.

About the author

Kristy Tsun-Tzu Hsu is the Director of the Taiwan ASEAN Studies Center (TASC), Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER), Taiwan, and Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow at Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. Her areas of research interests include: international trade policy and economic/ trade law, economic integration, Southeast Asia study and dispute settlement. She obtained her J.D. from the School of Law, Soochow University, Taiwan. She provides consultation to Taiwan government on external economic policy, and involves the government’s WTO and FTA negotiations by participating in government-commissioned research projects and providing consultation and has led research projects of the joint/separate Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECA) feasibility study with a number of countries. She also serves as Committee member at the Gender Equality Committee, Executive Yuan, Expert Committee member at the Overseas Community Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Committee member at International Affair Committee, Taipei City Government, and adviser to a number of business and industrial associations in Taiwan.

Disclaimer: The opinions articulated above represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Asia Pacific Leadership Network or any of its members. The APLN’s website is a source of authoritative research and analysis and serves as a platform for debate and discussion among our senior network members, experts and practitioners, as well as the next generation of policymakers, analysts and advocates. Comments and responses can be emailed to apln@apln.network.

Image: President Lai Ching-Te delivers his inaugural address, 22 May 2024 (Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)

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