APLN Newsletter (5 June 2020)
Dear APLN members and colleagues,
Greetings to you. We wish you good health and safety during these times. As we enter the second half of 2020, APLN sends you our beginning of June updates, activities, and references.
APLN’s Activities
The APLN Secretariat in Seoul hosted our first Board of Directors meeting on Friday, May 29th 5:00 P.M. (KST; UTC + nine hours) online via Zoom. The Board of Directors discussed APLN’s 2019-2020 activities, financial statements, and budget plans. The Board of Directors is excited for APLN’s proposed activities for 2020-21. The next Board of Directors meeting will take place in November this year.
On June 3, 2020, Tuya Nyamosor was featured on APLN’s Corner of the Korea Times with her piece on “Coming Together to Save NPT Right Now.” Nyamosor raises concerns regarding the effects of great power competition on treaty-based responses to nuclear weapons. As the tensions between China and the U.S. are shaped towards expanding technological superiority, which includes military modernization, complex challenges arise. International cooperation and civil society engagement are advised in the time remaining prior to the 10th NPT Review Conference postponed to early 2021 as the demise of the New START and the CTBT will send off poor signals to the world. The author suggests that efforts to cooperate to raise visibility amongst disarmament actors in Northeast Asia must be more clearly made before the NPT Review Conference next year.
APLN continues to use YouTube and Twitter as part of our continued efforts for public outreach and branding. We hope to use both platforms to inform the public and policymakers about important events, issues, and knowledge. News, timely content, and APLN videos will continue to be shared to engage and interact with others as much as possible. It seems more important now than ever to stay connected through online means. Please subscribe and follow us on YouTube and Twitter!
Members’ Activities
“What the Five Nuclear Weapon States Can Do to Contain Nuclear Risks” is a piece written by APLN member Tong Zhao as part of a report titled Major Power Rivalry and Nuclear Risk Reduction: Perspectives from Russia, China, and the United States published by the Center for Global Security Research in May 2020. Zhao argues that the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) have a special responsibility to contain nuclear risks. Efforts to do so include: preventing the decoupling of NWS nuclear policy communities, framing principles for cooperative nuclear risk reduction, addressing areas of concern about future strategic military balances, and elevating and deepening existing dialogues.
References
On May 17, 2020 The Washington Post published a column by Max Boot, titled “Trump’s Nuclear Brinkmanship Keeps Backfiring, But He Keeps Doubling Down” where he points out Trump’s failure in pressuring other countries into nuclear deals and how his approach actually raised the risk of nuclear proliferation by announcing the pulling out of numerous deals, namely the Iran deal, the INF treaty, the Open Skies Treaty and possibly the New START Treaty. Boot criticized this posture especially at a time of a pandemic.
Andreas Persbo of the European Leadership Network wrote “Will the Trump Administration’s Accusations Doom the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?” for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists on May 18th, where he analyzes U.S. claims of Russian non-compliance of the “zero-yield” nuclear testing standard and gives a background as well as implications of these accusations. The article ends with recommendations for future deals a emphasizes that it is not too late for the U.S. to ratify, considering that the withdrawal from the treaty would entail a lose-lose situation.
On May 21, 2020, the European Leadership Network published a commentary titled “‘I’m Not Dead Yet!’: What the COVID-19 Prompted Postponement Could Mean for the 10th NPT Review Conference” written by Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. She argues that a lot of recent developments will need to be considered prior to the 10th NPT Review Conference, including COVID-19, US-Russia’s New START, the JCPOA, and the U.S. 2020 elections. However, the delay of the conference has also given states more time to put forth a more compelling vision for the treaty.
38 North published an article, titled “The North Korean Economy Under Sanctions and COVID-19” written by Bradley O. Babson on May 22nd. While COVID-19 has exacerbated negative trends in North Korea’s economy, the challenges it faces fundamentally remain the same as before: the need to balance economic development, sanctions, and regime survival. However, the pandemic also offers unique opportunities for North Korea to reshape longer-term relationships with the international community—e.g., cooperation on strengthening North Korean health systems and food security in relations to global health management.
Nautilus Institute published a special report on May 23, 2020, titled, “Last Chance: Communicating at the Nuclear Brink, Scenarios and Solutions Workshop, Synthesis Report.” It describes CATALINK, a novel “hotline” system that would enable secure and verifiable communications between leaders during nuclear crises and other high-stakes scenarios. This unique, resilient system designed for “radical simplicity” would augment hotlines currently used by governments around the world and provide links where they do not already exist.
On April 27, 2020, Cindy Vestergaard wrote “International Atomic Energy Agency Actively Responding to Covid-19” for the Stimson Center. Verstergaard discusses how the IAEA responded quickly and actively to adjust to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on its operations. The global lockdown made it difficult for inspectors to travel and monitor facilities. While the IAEA has focused on finding solutions, such as hosting webinars and providing guidance and kits to countries asking for assistance, more will need to be so that the global community is assured that nuclear material is being used for peaceful purposes even during a pandemic.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute issued on their site The Strategist on May 27, 2020, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in China’s National Defence”, redacted by Fiona S. Cunningham. The piece sheds light on the recent upgrade of Chinese nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and argues that this expansion in capability will neither alter China’s national defence strategy nor pose a threat to the rest of the world as long as there is no increase of threats from the U.S. and no new radical technological change. Moreover, there are a number of reasons that allow us to safely assume China won’t replace its land-based missile force with its sea-based one. The reason behind this advancement would therefore be found in its possible influence on US-China strategic stability.
On May 27, 2020, the Observer Research Foundation published an article written by Manoj Joshi, titled “Could a US nuclear test be a fortuitous opportunity for India?”. Joshi states that if the U.S. breaks the informal ban it has in place since its last test in September 1992, India is presented with an opportunity to follow suit and confirm the design of its thermonuclear bomb, something it failed to do in its 1998 tests. This remains a critical gap in India’s nuclear force posture.
On May 28, 2020, Nautilus Institute and Technology for Global Security published a report, titled “Communication Disruption Attacks on NC3,” written by Paul Bracken. Bracken argues that we must be careful about attacking enemy NC3 (Nuclear Command, Control & Communications) because it could lead to greater risks of uncontrolled escalation. The United States is currently in the worst possible situation because its communications disruption strategy is unclear. Attacking enemy communications should only be done after a more sober assessment of its consequences.
On May 28, 2020, Reuters published an article written by Doina Chiacu and edited by Bernadette Baum, titled “Biden Calls Trump Nuclear Testing Discussion Reckless, Dangerous.” The former vice president said the possible resumption of nuclear weapons tests by the United States would not bring Moscow or Beijing to the negotiating table on a new arms control agreement, but would more likely prompt other countries to resume military significant nuclear testing and undermine nonproliferation goals.
David Axe wrote an article titled “Donald Trump’s Nuke-Testing Idea Is ‘Catastrophically Stupid’” published by Forbes on May 29, 2020. The Trump administration is reportedly discussing the possibility of resuming nuclear-weapons tests following a 28-year moratorium. Several nuclear experts argue that resuming tests would trigger other countries to do the same, making the outbreak of a nuclear war more likely.
“Nuclear Weapons: The Reason Why Even Iran Fears Israel” is an article written by Kyle Mizokami from The National Interest, published by Yahoo! News on June 1, 2020. Israel maintains a high-tech and tough military, but it also has the ultimate weapon—a small but powerful nuclear stockpile. Experts generally assess the country as having approximately eighty land, air, and sea-based nuclear weapons.
Kyle Mizokami from The National Interest wrote an article titled “Forget Russia, Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons Are A Real Threat,” published by Yahoo! News on June 2, 2020. Mizokami argues that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, particularly their tactical nuclear weapons, are an asymmetric means of offsetting India’s advantage in conventional forces. Despite being defensive in nature, the use of nuclear weapons by one side could rapidly escalate to the use of larger, strategic weapons against populated areas by both sides.
On June 3, 2020, Associated Press News published an article titled “Putin signs Russia’s nuclear deterrent policy,” written by Vladimir Isachenkov. President Vladimir Putin endorsed a nuclear deterrent policy which allows Russia to use atomic weapons in response to a conventional strike targeting the nation’s critical government and military infrastructure. This inclusion of a non-nuclear attack as a possible trigger for nuclear retaliation reflects Moscow’s longtime concern over U.S. military plans.
The European Leadership Network issued a commentary on the implications of the rescheduling of the NPT Review Conference and the Global Enterprise to Strengthen Nonproliferation and Disarmament (GE)’s initiative: “The Global Enterprise: a Roadmap to Achieving Success at the 2021 NPT Review Conference” was redacted by Isabelle Williams, a project staff for the GE. In the commentary she reported the three main areas that are pivotal for making progress on nuclear issues for the NPT Review Conference, individuated in risk reduction, transparency and fissile material management.
As always, APLN asks members and colleagues to send us your recent activites or references from your respective countries to share with all those involved. Please send us any updates or resources to our email address at apln@apln.network.
Thank you.
With warm regards,
The APLN Secretariat
Asia Pacific Leadership Network
102 Sajik-ro, Jongno-gu
Seoul, Republic of Korea (03169)
Tel: +82-2-2135-2170