Jakarta Declaration on Nuclear Weapons

  • AUTHORAsia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
  • Sep 4, 2014

A joint declaration by 29 political, diplomatic, military and scientific leaders from 14 Asia-Pacific countries strongly supporting a nuclear weapon-free region and world and calling on policymakers to urgently re-energize the nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security agendas. The Jakarta Declaration on Nuclear Weapons calls for immediate, realistically achievable confidence-building steps towards disarmament by each of the nuclear-armed states in the region.

We, the undersigned members of the Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN),

Acutely conscious that the world’s more than 16,000 remaining nuclear weapons are strongly concentrated in the Asia Pacific region, with the US and Russia having over 90 per cent of the world’s stockpile and major strategic footprints here, China, India, and Pakistan all having significant arsenals, and the breakout state of North Korea continuing to build its capability,

Noting with grave concern that the number of nuclear weapons in the Asia Pacific is growing, substantial modernization programs are occurring and reliance on nuclear weapons in national security policies is not diminishing,

Noting further that most of the projected world growth in civil nuclear energy – with all the proliferation, safety and security risks associated with such energy production unless it is closely and effectively regulated – will occur in the Asia Pacific,

Profoundly conscious of the grave risks posed to life on this planet as we know it by any use of nuclear weapons, the most indiscriminately inhumane ever invented, and the inevitability of their use deliberately, or by accident or miscalculation, so long as any exist,

Believing that the risks associated with the possession of nuclear weapons in today’s world far outweigh any deterrent utility they may have had in the past or continue to have,

Noting the importance of the growing international movement, at both government and civil society levels, to recognize and respond to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons,

Noting with grave concern, nonetheless, the minimal progress made in advancing the global nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security agendas in recent years, and the damage being done to those agendas by the recent sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and the United States,

Recalling and reaffirming our strong continuing commitment to a world and Asia Pacific region free of nuclear weapons, as expressed in our Ho Chi Minh City Declaration on Disarmament of October 2013, and expressing our strong continuing support for national, regional and global efforts to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and improve nuclear security and safety,

Reiterating our strong belief that a world free of nuclear weapons is achievable through a step-by-step process, and that such steps should not await efforts to improve regional and global security but be pursued in tandem with them,

Recognizing, nonetheless, that it will be difficult to make significant progress on nuclear issues without peace, stability and trust among the major state actors, and the critical need accordingly for high priority to be given to confidence-building measures including regular, sustained and serious high-level dialogue on strategic issues, bilaterally and through regional dialogue processes; increased military transparency; and the establishment of hotlines, codes of conduct and other arrangements for the management of disputes and crises,

Emphasizing that regional organizations and mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and the Six Party Talks have a vital role to play in addressing both regional security generally and nuclear risks in particular,

Call upon policymakers in the Asia Pacific region to re-energize the nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security agendas, and to act accordingly as follows:


Nuclear Doctrine

1. As a first major step towards nuclear disarmament all states, including nuclear-armed states and allies and partners relying on their protection, should support changes to nuclear doctrine and posture which dramatically reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policy, on the basis that this promotes confidence-building, strengthens the norm of non-use of nuclear weapons, reduces the risks of accidental and unauthorized use, and counteracts crisis instability.

2. All nuclear-armed states should, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, accept that their sole purpose is to deter nuclear war, embrace the principle of ‘No First Use’ in their respective nuclear doctrines, and reinforce this by:

  • taking nuclear weapons off high operational alert status,
  • avoiding forward deployment of nuclear weapons, and
  • separating warheads from land and air-based delivery vehicles and storing them physically apart in disassembled state.

3. All states should support the negotiation of a global Convention enshrining the principles of sole purpose and No First Use, as a step towards a Nuclear Weapons Convention ultimately completely banning the use and possession of nuclear weapons.

4. All states that have nuclear weapons should provide unconditional negative security assurances that they will not threaten to use, or use, such weapons against states that do not have them.

Nuclear Weapons Numbers

5. Russia and the US should continue to abide by and implement all existing bilateral and multilateral agreements and understandings, including the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and negotiate a follow-on agreement to New START to reduce dramatically the number of all nuclear weapons in their stockpiles.

6. Pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, the acknowledged nuclear-armed states should commit not only to not increasing their nuclear weapon stockpiles, but to reducing them to the lowest levels consistent with maintaining minimum effective retaliatory capability, and provide sufficient transparent information to give the international community confidence in these commitments.

7. To help to create the conditions for reducing nuclear weapons numbers, those states pursuing advanced conventional capabilities, including missile defence and long-range precision strike, should make special efforts not to let these capabilities impede progress on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.


8. All nuclear-armed states should attend, and participate constructively in, the next conference of the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in Vienna on 8–9 December 2014.

9. All NPT Member States should support efforts by the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution to convene a conference on a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction before the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

10. The leaders attending the November 2014 East Asia Summit should set the 2015 East Asia Summit as the target for developing and announcing both general and nuclear confidence-building measures.

11. The 70th anniversary commemoration in August 2015 of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings should be seen as an opportunity for world leaders to demonstrate their commitment to, and to generate momentum towards the achievement of, a nuclear-weapon-free world.

12. Following the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion in 1996 on the legality of nuclear weapons, there should be confirmation and clarification of the status under international law of the possession and use of nuclear weapons. We note in this respect the case brought by the Marshall Islands to the ICJ alleging violation by the nuclear-armed states of their legal obligation to disarm.


13. NPT States Parties should work energetically and constructively at the 2015 NPT Review Conference to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation as well as disarmament regime, including by universal adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol.

14. Welcoming the signatures of all nuclear-weapon states of the protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, all such states should also accede to the protocols of the other relevant regional nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) and, where outstanding issues prevent this, work with NWFZ parties to find solutions.

15. Recognizing that North Korea’s nuclear program poses a serious threat to regional and global non-proliferation efforts and to the peace and stability of this region, all countries concerned should explore all ways and means to advance the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, including North Korea abandoning all its nuclear weapons and programs as stipulated by the Joint Statement of September 2005.

16. The P5 plus Germany and Iran should continue to engage positively on resolving the concerns about the possible weapons dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program and Iran should maintain its cooperation with the IAEA on resolving present and past issues.

17. Welcoming the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by our host state Indonesia, other states whose signature and/or ratification is necessary to bring that treaty into force should so act as soon as possible, without awaiting such action by any other State Party, and in the meantime maintain a moratorium on all nuclear tests.

18. Pakistan and all other states should support the urgent commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), preferably within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. Pending negotiation of an FMCT, all relevant states should announce and apply a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and declare their past production of fissile material, including current stockpiles.

19. All states should implement fully the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, to prohibit non-state actors developing, acquiring, or transferring weapons of mass destruction, including enacting and enforcing the required legislation and reporting to the UNSC 1540 Committee.

20. All states should ensure that peaceful nuclear energy programs do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and do not endanger human and environmental health and safety.


21. All states should build and sustain strong nuclear security and safety cultures in relation to all fissile material, nuclear weapons and military and civil nuclear facilities, share best practices and take serious steps to strengthen the international nuclear security architecture.

22. All states should implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment, and the provisions of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

23. All states should minimize stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium, convert reactor fuel from HEU to low enriched uranium, and support efforts to use non-HEU technologies for the production of radioisotopes.

24. All states should secure all radioactive sources, consistent with guidance in the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and Nuclear Security Series recommendations.

25. All states should ratify and abide by the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. They should strive to attain higher nuclear safety standards and disaster preparedness, and intensify the peer review process for nuclear safety.

26. All states should promote intensive dialogue among and between nuclear industry and government bodies, including national regulators, with a view to improving nuclear security and safety regulations, regulatory effectiveness and transparency, and, supplementing other mechanisms like South Korea’s proposed North East Asia nuclear safety consultative mechanism, there should be established an Asia Pacific Regulators’ Network, focusing on consolidating and sharing best practices in nuclear security.

27. The East Asia Summit should explore the concept of an Asia Pacific Nuclear Energy Community, which would strengthen nuclear energy governance in the region across all three crucial areas of safeguards, security and safety.

28. All states should use all tools available to regulate nuclear transfers and counter illicit transfers of nuclear material, including through effective export control arrangements.


29. The APLN collectively, and its Members individually, will work:

  • to increase the pool of leaders and future leaders in Asia Pacific countries with a depth of expertise and knowledge of nuclear issues;
  • to expand APLN by broadening its membership to include a wider range of established leaders in the public sector, private sector and research and advocacy communities;
  • to identify and mentor future opinion leaders on nuclear issues in each country in the region, and promote nuclear confidence-building in the region by encouraging dialogue and networking among such future nuclear leaders across the region;
  • to form for this purpose, alongside the APLN, an Asia Pacific Next Generation Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament;
  • to contribute to professional and public education and training by organizing and participating in workshops, seminars and public events in order to increase awareness and knowledge of nuclear policy issues.

30. The real and immediate threat posed by nuclear weapons can no longer be ignored or downplayed by policymakers. The time for serious action on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, security and safety is now.

Text Agreed Jakarta, 18 August 2014. Released 4 September 2014


Gareth Evans (Australia), Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia (APLN Convenor)

Nobuyasu Abe (Japan), Former United Nations Under-Secretary General for Disarmament

Hasmy Agam (Malaysia), Former Ambassador to the United Nations

James Bolger (New Zealand), Former Prime Minister

P. R. Chari (India), Former Additional Secretary, Ministry of Defence

Chun Yungwoo (Republic of Korea), Former Senior Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs & National Security

Cui Liru (China), Former President, Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations

Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), Former United Nations Under-Secretary General for Disarmament

Aiko Doden (Japan), Senior Commentator, NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)

Malcolm Fraser (Australia), Former Prime Minister

Robert Hill (Australia), Former Defence Minister

Pervez Hoodbhoy (Pakistan), Professor of Nuclear Physics, Quaid-e-Azam University

Kuniko Inoguchi (Japan), Diet Member, Former Minister, Ambassador to Geneva Conference on Disarmament

Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan), Gen. (ret’d); Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Yoriko Kawaguchi (Japan), Former Foreign Minister

Yohei Kono (Japan), Former Foreign Minister and Speaker of the House of Representatives

Kishore Mahbubani (Singapore), Former Ambassador to the United Nations

Lalit Mansingh (India), Former Foreign Secretary

Moon Chung-in (Republic of Korea), Editor in Chief, Global Asia

Geoffrey Palmer (New Zealand), Former Prime Minister

Pan Zhenqiang (China), Maj.-Gen. (ret.); Former Director, Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defence University

R. Rajaraman (India), Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

ShaZukang (China), Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General

Song Min-soon (Republic of Korea), Former Foreign Minister

Rakesh Sood (India), Former Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Ton Nu ThiNinh (Vietnam), Former Ambassador to the European Union

Nyamosor Tuya (Mongolia), Former Foreign Minister

Shashi Tyagi (India), Air Chief Marshal (ret’d); Former Chief of the Indian Air Force

Nur Hassan Wirajuda (Indonesia), Former Foreign Minister

Wiryono Sastrohandoyo (Indonesia), Former Ambassador to Australia